Providence College

DigitalCommons@Providence
History & Classics Undergraduate Theses

History & Classics

12-15-2018

Soldiers’ Motivations to Fight in World War II: The United States
Army and the German Wehrmacht in the European Theatre
Anthony E. Hart
Providence College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/history_undergrad_theses
Part of the History Commons

Hart, Anthony E., "Soldiers’ Motivations to Fight in World War II: The United States Army and the German
Wehrmacht in the European Theatre" (2018). History & Classics Undergraduate Theses. 11.
https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/history_undergrad_theses/11

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the History & Classics at DigitalCommons@Providence.
It has been accepted for inclusion in History & Classics Undergraduate Theses by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Providence. For more information, please contact dps@providence.edu.

Soldiers’ Motivations to Fight in World War II: The United States Army and the
German Wehrmacht in the European Theatre

by
Anthony E. Hart
HIS 490 History Honors Thesis

Department of History
Providence College
Fall 2018

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ……………………………….…………………………………………. 1
COUNTERING MISCONSCEPTIONS ………………………………………………..…... 7
TRAINING & COMRADERY ……….…………………………………………………… 13
OFFICERS ……………………………………………………………………………….... 19
INSTITUTIONAL PUNISHMENT .……………………………………………….……... 25
GERMAN WAR CRIMES AND FEAR OF THE ENEMY ………………………………. 32
ENDING THE TASK & THE HOME FRONT ………………………………….……….. 38
THE ROLE OF ALCOHOL …………………………………………………………….… 41
COMBAT EXHAUSTION, REPLACEMENTS, and UNIT ROTATION ………….……. 43
CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………………. 53
BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………………………….……… 56

iii

INTRODUCTION
The European theatre of the Second World War has often been perceived as an
ideological conflict driven by nationalism and patriotism. For Führer Adolf Hitler’s National
Socialist party in Germany, it was a war to annihilate people who were perceived as inferior and
even “subhuman.” This included the Polish, Jews, Bolsheviks, and all other identities whom the
Nazis believed to be a threat to the Aryan race. In addition, the loss of territory and the
economic collapse that Germany faced following the First World War were fresh in the minds of
Hitler and the Germany people. The “ethnic-racist nationalism” instilled in the German people
by the Nazi regime, along with a patriotic fervor to fight for (and regain portions of) their
country, resulted in support for the war from a large portion of the German population. 1 For
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the United States, World War II was a patriotic fight
necessary for the security of the United States and its allies. In 1940, even prior to the United
States Senate’s declarations of war against Japan and Germany, FDR acknowledged the Nazis as
a danger “to American civilization.” In his call for the U.S. to be the “arsenal of democracy,”
FDR stated, “If Great Britain goes down…[the Axis powers] will be in a position to bring
enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say all
of us in the Americas would be living at a point of a gun – a gun loaded with explosive bullets,
economic as well as military.” 2 A patriotic fervor to defend the United States and its values
became the driving force behind U.S. mobilization, as the American people embraced their role
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as the arsenal of democracy and came to support the fight against the Axis powers. Ideology,
patriotism, and nationalism may have been the motivations of leaders and citizens on the home
front in Germany and the United States, but what about the men in the American and German
armies fighting on the front lines? They may have been similarly motivated prior to their
deployment, but what motivated soldiers in the U.S. Army and the Wehrmacht to continue
fighting as the war dragged on and as they endured the horrors of combat? Were the
motivational factors of American soldiers similar to or distinct from those of German soldiers?
These are the questions which this paper seeks to answer.
Various historians and sociologists have analyzed the potential factors that motivated
American soldiers to continuously endure combat, even after engaging in horrific bloodshed,
experiencing brutal weather conditions, and reaching the point of physical and mental
exhaustion. S.L.A. Marshall, chief U.S. Army combat historian of the European theatre
throughout World War II, believes that “ego is the most important of the motor forces driving the
soldier, and [if] it were not for the ego, it would be impossible to make men face the risks of
battle.” Marshall further explains that “personal honor is the one thing [soldiers value] more
than life itself,” as they loathed the thought of expressing fear in front of their comrades,
something which was considered “cowardice.” 3 Therefore, soldiers sought to maintain their
personal honor and the trust of their comrades by attempting to constantly appear strong in their
words and actions. Historian Francis Steckel contends that soldier motivation was even more
closely linked to comrades than is argued by Marshall. Steckel claims that “many soldiers
endured the horrors of combat through the sustaining bonds of loyalty, feeling of security, and
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sense of unit pride instilled by long service as part of a cohesive group.” 4 Studs Terkel agrees
that, “for the typical American soldier,” it was not wanting to fail his fellow comrades which
“impelled him up front.” 5 Unlike Marshall, Steckel, and Terkel, Samuel Stouffer believes that
there was not one major factor which motivated U.S. soldiers. Rather, in his two-volume work
The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, Stouffer argues that soldiers’ motivation
derived from six major factors: coercive institutional authority, combat leaders, the “informal
social group,” men’s attitudes toward the war and the enemy, “residual goals” (desire to get
home, hope of victory, etc.), and prayer and personal philosophies. 6 Many historians have
offered their take on the impact of these individual factors outlined by Stouffer. For example, in
their article “Are There Atheists in Foxholes?: Combat Intensity and Religious Behavior,” Brian
and Craig Wansink assert that religion played a more significant factor for U.S. soldiers than had
previously been acknowledged. Nevertheless, historians generally agree that comradeship was
the factor that most significantly motivated American soldiers to continue fighting. Even Brian
and Craig Wansink acknowledge that “soldiers can use a number of coping strategies to gain,
maintain, or regain their motivations” and religion is just “one direction that a veteran could
turn,” if they turned to it at all. 7
Historians have also sought to understand what drove Wehrmacht soldiers to be so
steadfast in battle, even when German defeat seemed imminent. In “Cohesion and
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4
Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” one of the earliest studies seeking to discover
the motivations behind the intense dedication of German soldiers, Edward Shils and Morris
Janowitz counter the common public opinion that the “unity” and “tenacity” of the German
Army was due to ideological motivations, specifically “strong Nationalist Socialist political
convictions.” Rather, Shils and Janowitz argue that the motivation and “determined resistance”
of Wehrmacht soldiers were a result of “the steady satisfaction of certain primary personality
demands afforded by the social organization of the army.” In other words, Wehrmacht soldiers
developed close bonds with their fellow comrades who soon became their primary group –
“one’s immediate face-to-face social [circle]” – and their main source of motivation. 8 Martin
van Creveld similarly contends that the German soldiers did not fight because of National
Socialist beliefs but out of loyalty to their fellow soldiers and to the Wehrmacht system. In his
book Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945, van Creveld argues,
“The average German soldier in World War II…did not as a rule fight out of a belief in Nazi
ideology…Instead he fought for the reasons that men have always fought: because he felt
himself a member of a well integrated, well-led team whose structure, administration, and
functioning were perceived to be…equitable and just.” 9
Many historians, such as Omer Bartov, disagree with the assertions of Shils, Janowitz,
and van Creveld. Although Bartov recognizes the importance of comradeship, he contends that
“real ‘primary groups’ do not fully explain combat motivation due to their unfortunate tendency
to disintegrate just when they are most needed.” Rather, Bartov emphasizes the importance of

8

Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in
World War II,” in Public Opinion Quarterly 12, no. 2 (1948): 281.
9

Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 163-164.

5
ideology. He argues that, although not all soldiers were “committed National Socialists,” Hitler
was able to tailor to the public’s “powerful need to believe in something or someone beyond the
mundane material needs and hardships of daily life.” This was particularly necessary for
Wehrmacht troops “whose dependence on belief in a cause was greatly enhanced by constant
danger and fear.” 10 Similarly, while acknowledging the importance of comradeship, Stephen
Fritz claims, “World War II, especially that part of it fought in Russia, was the ultimate
ideological war…with the enemy idea threatening the validity of the National Socialist concepts
that a surprisingly large number of Landsers (common soldiers) embraced. And the staying
power of the average German soldier, his sense of seriousness and purpose…depended in large
measure on the conviction that National Socialist Germany had redeemed the failures of World
War I and had restored, both individually and collectively, a uniquely German sense of
identity.” 11 Therefore, historians studying the Wehrmacht tend to agree on the importance of
comradeship in keeping soldier motivated, but have differed in their analysis of the role of
National Socialist ideology.
It is important to note that each U.S. and German soldier fighting in the European theatre
was motivated differently according to their background and individual experiences.
Nevertheless, there was much common ground between American and Wehrmacht soldiers in
regard to what motivated them to continue fighting. Once they experienced battle, the
overarching concern for soldiers on both sides was surviving the war. In their best attempt to do
so, and to stay motivated during long bouts on the frontline, soldiers constantly relied on their
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comrades, officers, and training. Comrades represented the primary motivational factor for the
majority of soldiers on both sides. As they endured training and the horrors of combat together,
men formed unique, durable bonds with their fellow soldiers, the likes of which are generally
unknown outside of the realm of war. Soldiers not only relied on their comrades to keep them
distracted as they anxiously awaited battle, but also developed a trust in their “buddies” which
gave them hope of victory and survival. In addition, for soldiers in both armies, motivation was
enhanced by numerous secondary factors including confidence in their training and preparedness
as well as trust in and respect for the officers leading them into battle. However, it is important
to acknowledge that the organizational structure and the value system of the U.S. Army and the
Wehrmacht differed greatly, meaning that the importance that the armies placed on these factors
varied. As a result, although soldiers shared secondary motivational factors which were
generally similar, the way and extent to which these factors affected soldiers differed between
armies.
There were also motivational factors that were fairly distinct to American soldiers and
others that were unique to German soldiers. For example, brutal punishments from higher
authority – commonly execution – was a major factor that kept German soldiers on the frontline.
Contrarily, because sentences were much less severe, punishment from institutional authority
played only a limited role in motivating American soldiers. Furthermore, Wehrmacht soldiers’
hatred and fear of the Red Army was a leading motivational factor, especially toward the end of
the war. As a result of the numerous atrocities committed by Germans against Bolshevik and
other civilian populations, which a majority of Wehrmacht soldiers either observed or
participated in, soldiers feared that defeat at the hands of the Red Army meant facing violent
retribution by Russian soldiers. On the other hand, hatred or fear of the enemy was not a
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significant motivating factor for American soldiers fighting in the European theatre. Rather,
with victory seen as a likely prospect as the U.S. Army drove across Europe, the American
soldier’s desire to fulfill one’s duty, win the war, and return home was constantly looming in
their mind. Similarly, although “getting the job done” was not a concept communicated by
Wehrmacht soldiers as it was by Americans, letters from home reminded German soldiers of a
world outside of the war and boosted overall morale. Also, despite the conviction that
Wehrmacht soldiers were strongly driven by National Socialist ideology, as presented by Fritz
and Bartov, the typical soldier was not politically motivated. Ideology played a role in
motivating German soldiers, but it was the ideas and values of the Wehrmacht – similar yet
distinguished from Nazism – that were instilled in soldiers and motivated them in battle. On the
other hand, there were various issues which had demoralizing impacts on soldiers of both sides,
the most prevalent being combat exhaustion. Combat exhaustion was a major issue for
American troops because a poor U.S. Army replacement system kept combat units on the front
lines for extended periods of time. Although the Wehrmacht’s replacement system proved much
more efficient than that of the U.S. Army, German soldiers similarly struggled when they faced
long or intense periods of combat.

Countering Misconceptions
There are common misconceptions about the motivational factors for American and
German soldiers fighting on the frontline during the Second World War. First, for American
soldiers it is often believed that patriotism and the defense of American values were primary
motivational factors. However, while some soldiers may have felt this sentiment when they first
joined the Army, patriotism and ideological beliefs were insignificant in keeping combat soldiers
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motivated throughout the war. As S.L.A. Marshall noted, “the pride in a uniform or belief in
[the] national cause” were not sufficient motivational factors for keeping soldiers steadfast in
battle. 12 Similarly, Wesley Simon observed the Second World War as a shift in the history of
combat motivation, arguing that “out went previous doctrines that men fought for moral reasons
(patriotism, esprit de corps, pride and leadership, and so on) and in came the core role of smallgroup psychology.” 13 Once soldiers experienced combat, they rarely relied on politics or pride
in American values. As Army veteran Robert “Bobby” Rasmus put it, “The reason you storm
the beaches is not patriotism or bravery. It’s that sense of not wanting to fail your buddies.” 14
This shift away from patriotic fervor was common as soldiers transitioned from training in the
States to combat in Europe. In fact, one study by Stouffer found that soldiers in training were far
less likely to hold doubts that the War was worth fighting than soldiers engaged or previously
engaged in combat, as forty-nine percent of those training responded that they had never
expressed such feelings. This is compared to veteran infantry divisions where only thirty-two
percent of soldiers claimed that they had never held doubts, while an overwhelming forty-three
percent claimed that they “sometimes” or “very often” felt that the war was not worth fighting. 15
The decrease in patriotic fervor as soldiers transitioned to life on the rontlines can be
attributed to the fact that the bigger picture – the political and ideological aspects – of the War
mattered little to the majority of American combat soldiers. Soldiers cared little about these
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aspects because ideology and patriotism had little relevance to their immediate circumstances.
Rather, they were primarily concerned with survival. As Rasmus asserts, “I was preoccupied
with staying alive and doing my job.” 16 Stouffer similarly argues that as soldiers experienced the
realities of combat, “any talk that did not subordinate idealistic values and patriotism to the
harsher realities of the combat situation [was seen as] hypocritical.” 17 As one European combat
veteran explained, “Ask any dogface on the line. You’re fighting for your skin on the line. When
I enlisted I was patriotic as hell. There’s no patriotism on the line. A boy up there 60 days in the
line is in danger every minute. He ain’t fighting for no patriotism.” 18 Although soldiers may
have entered the U.S. Army motivated by patriotism or ideological beliefs, these were
insignificant motivational factors for soldiers on the frontlines who were primarily concerned
about their immediate situation, particularly their own survival and that of their comrades.
Another misconception about the combat soldier during WWII is that the political and
ideological beliefs of National Socialism were primary motivational factors for men in the
German army. There is no doubt that a majority of soldiers had been manipulated by National
Socialism in some way. As Ute Frevert points out, Hitler’s government “hastened to inject
institutions with the key specific National Socialist concepts intended to shape and inspire the
entire population – and for men, this entailed a primary self-definition of soldiers.” 19 These
efforts, along with Nazi propaganda and the repression of political opponents, made it incredibly
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difficult for German citizens, including those entering the Wehrmacht, to avoid being influenced
by National Socialism. In addition, National Socialist racial ideology gave German soldiers
justification for the atrocities that they committed against Jewish, Polish, Russian, and a number
of other men, women, and children, and these were only amplified by the complacency of
Wehrmacht command. However, for a majority of soldiers, once they got on the battlefield
National Socialist political and ideological beliefs did little to motivate soldiers to continue
fighting. There were a small number of soldiers who were highly motivated by National
Socialist ideology, but these tended to be a minority who were raised during the Hitler Youth
Generation. As eighteen-year-old paratrooper Egon Klopp stated, “I was raised as a National
Socialist and I remain a National Socialist.” 20 However, soldiers who were committed National
Socialists, like this young man, had typically grown up in what Shils and Janowitz describe as
“the most rewarding period of Nazi Socialism,” making them more susceptible to National
Socialist ideology. In fact, it is estimated that “Hard-Core” National Socialists made up only 1015 per cent of enlisted men, and these were mainly junior officers who had little to no experience
with other ideological systems. 21 Furthermore, by 1944 and 1945 German victory appeared less
likely as a result of the momentum gained by the Soviet victory at Stalingrad and the United
States’ entrance into the war. As a result, there was new ideological imperative adopted by
soldiers: “defence of the Reich.” Even so, as is mentioned by Ian Kershaw, this phrase did not
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simply encapsulate defense of National Socialism, but “defence of family, home, property and
cultural roots.” 22
Rather than National Socialism, it was the similar, yet distinct, values and ideas of the
Wehrmacht that had a significant motivating impact on German soldiers throughout the war.
Fritz argues that “an army – and the men within it, cannot be completely separated from the
value system that produced it.” 23 This is true in that many National Socialist ideas such as
Volksgemeinschaft, or peoples community, and Aryan racial superiority were embraced by the
Wehrmacht in order to form universal cohesiveness beyond just the combat unit. However, in
the context of combat motivation, it is important to distinguish National Socialism and the values
and ideas of the Wehrmacht as separate ideologies which motivated soldiers differently.
The values and ideals which had the most significant impact on motivating combat
soldiers were those instilled in them during the intense, often brutish, Wehrmacht training. Felix
Römer argues that, as soldiers progressed through training, “traditional [socio-cultural] dividing
lines were largely blurred” because men from all backgrounds began to identify themselves with
the Wehrmacht’s “canon of values.” 24 The most important of these values was community and
cohesiveness, both in individual units and throughout the Wehrmacht as a whole. As is
mentioned by Fritz, “The Wehrmacht not only stressed the notion of comradeship but did so in a
consciously ideological manner: the [frontline soldiers were] to be the kernel from which would
grow the Volksgemeinschaft.” 25 Karl Fuchs’ letter to his father displays how successful this
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effort was. He happily admits “I’ve become such an integral part of my company that I couldn’t
leave it ever again.” 26 The success of the Wehrmacht’s effort to instill community throughout
the Army became fully exposed when soldiers entered combat, as they relied on their training
and their comrades to succeed in battle and stay motivated in extended episodes on the frontline.
The Wehrmacht also instilled in soldiers a sense of superiority over their opponents,
echoing the National Socialist core belief in the superiority of the Aryan race. According to
Fritz, the Wehrmacht gave a German soldier a sense of “individual superiority [which], he
thought, resulted from his superior training, greater toughness, more resilient morale, and better
leadership – all products of the Wehrmacht’s stress on camaraderie and [community].” 27
Corporal Karl Behnke emphasized this feeling of superiority stating, “The morale and fighting
spirit of the German infantry are incomparable. No other group of soldiers could accomplish
what they have done.” 28 In fact, one morale questionnaire of German POWS found that more
than ninety-percent of those interviewed “revealed a positive opinion of the soldierly virtues of
the Wehrmacht,” while only forty-two percent “expressed themselves unreservedly positively
about National Socialism.” 29 Therefore, although the Wehrmacht was certainly not exempt from
racism, soldiers’ belief in German fighting superiority is the idea more responsible for increasing
their confidence during combat. The ideas and values instilled in soldiers by the Wehrmacht,
primarily focused on the values of comradeship and community, echoed those of National
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Socialism, but Wehrmacht ideology was distinct and had a wider impact on soldiers than
National Socialism.

Training & Comradery
German and American soldiers were primarily motivated by their comrades. It was with
their fellow soldiers that individuals endured training, adapted to life on the frontlines, won and
lost battles, and witnessed their friends become casualties. The presence of comrades gave
soldiers confidence that they would survive, that their unit would be victorious in battle, and
offered a social relationship which helped ease the fears and anxieties that accumulated during
long periods of combat. The role of comradery as motivation typically began during intense,
rigorous training for soldiers on both sides. Training was an opportunity for soldiers to bond
over the physical and mental struggles that they had to endure at the hands of (often despised)
drill instructors. In addition, it was a chance to get to know one another personally and to gain
an understanding of each other’s strengths and weaknesses. Easy Company was a part of an elite
paratrooper unit of the U.S. Army which underwent rigorous training that tested each man
physically and mentally. One example of rigorous training was long and constant night marches,
often under difficult conditions. Former Corporal Walter Gordon remembers, “We would cut
across country and crawl under fences and through gaps and go through creeks. I could see a
silhouette at night and tell you who it was. I could tell by the way he wore his hat, how the
helmet sat on his head, how he slung his rifle.” 30 Gordon’s keen awareness of comrades and
their simple mannerisms was a result of training, where soldiers “grew intimate.” Training for
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infantrymen in nonelite units had its own difficulties, as “marching and bivouacking consumed
much of an enlistee’s time,” along with various classroom lectures and additional physical
training. 31 Dee Carl Perguson Jr. journaled his experience at Army infantry training, which
included a final twenty-mile hike “in the most horrific down-poor imaginable.” “No one had to
sing lullabies to induce sleep,” Perguson noted of the exhaustion that came with training.
Although difficult, training brought men together to form the unit cohesion necessary for
combat. 32 Easy Company paratrooper Darrell “Shifty” Powers remembers the comradery that
resulted from Army training, recalling, “These people that you’re in service with, you know
those people better than you’ll ever know anybody in your life. You know them right down to
the final thing, you know? And that comes when you start your training, while that
progresses.” 33 U.S. Army soldiers went into combat with an already strong personal relationship
with their comrades. (This was not the case for replacement soldiers who typically found it
difficult to integrate themselves into combat units, but this will be discussed later in the essay).
Wehrmacht training had an identical bonding effect for German soldiers. Fritz
comments, “training aimed to build a sense of group identity and solidarity out of shared
privations.” 34 These privations included long periods without food and/or sleep, exercises with
live ammunition – during which casualties were not uncommon – and physical training that
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brought soldiers to ultimate exhaustion. “One sweated blood,” German soldier Guy Sajer
remarked. “One was either hospitalized after a week of almost insane effort or incorporated into
the division and marched off to war.” 35 These tactics, many utilized by the U.S. Army during its
own training, were meant to test the will of soldiers, prepare them for combat, and build
cohesiveness. Former Wehrmacht soldier Friedrich Grupe commented on training, claiming,
“There was no mercy…[but] you get accustomed to it, especially the comradeship with
comrades, which helps you get over very much.” 36 Hans Wener Woltersdorf went even further,
asserting “my unit was my home, my family, which I had to protect.” 37 Therefore, like
American G.I.’s, German soldiers had strong relationships with their comrades even prior to
entering combat. However, soldiers’ relationships with one another grew even deeper once they
experienced life on the frontlines.
Rigorous training exercises and methods, although harsh and sometimes brutish, were a
way to prepare soldiers for the horrific conditions of war on the frontlines. Remembering his
mindset heading into combat, one Easy Company soldier recalled, “In the back of your mind,
you’re wondering what’s going to happen [to you]. You know you’ve been trained and trained
and trained on what your job is going to be and what you’re supposed to do. That’s what you’ve
gotta think about.” 38 A common saying during Wehrmacht training was “sweat saves blood.”
However, soldiers only fully understood the true accuracy of this saying once they engaged in
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combat. Linking training to life on the Eastern front, Woltersdorf remarked, “Nothing is more
burdensome than having to suffer harassment and injustice, but nothing increases self-confidence
more than having withstood hardships.” 39 Fritz-Erich Diemke put it more bluntly, stating, “In
the war, we survived…because of this hard training.” 40 In the end, training increased motivation
because the drills and exercises put soldiers under stresses similar to those which they would
experience in combat. Having experienced these stresses made it easier for soldiers to adjust to
life on the frontlines and gave them confidence in their and their comrades’ abilities on the
battlefield.
As was previously mentioned, survival was the ultimate and most pressing concern for
soldiers. In their best attempt to make it through each day on the frontline, comrades constantly
depended on one another. As result of the unbreakable bonds that they developed during training
and throughout combat, soldiers trusted their comrades with their lives. Soldiers not only knew
their “buddies” personally and cared about their well-being, but they trusted that the soldier next
to them had the skills and training necessary to defeat the enemy and get them out of the war
alive. Kershaw notes that, for Wehrmacht soldiers, “self-survival depended in great measure
upon the actions of immediate comrades. Self-interest determined, therefore, that the fight for
survival was also a fight for the survival of those fighting alongside.” 41 Stouffer similarly asserts
of American soldiers, “The goal of survival [enforced] close teamwork with others in the outfit.
The life of each depended as much on the feeling of close mutual dependence which has been
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seen to be so important as a basis for other aspects of combat motivation.” 42 In both armies, the
relationships that soldiers developed in their comrades during training and in combat increased
motivation as they became confident that their unit would be victorious in battle and that their
buddies would help safeguard their own survival.
Although every soldier was capable of experiencing combat exhaustion, it was the trust in
and distraction by comrades that prolonged or even prevented many from expressing fear and
anxiety. Comrades offered a way for combat soldiers to pass the immense amount of downtime
that came with life on the frontlines, typically in foxholes and often under brutal weather
conditions. This is opposed to spending excess time isolated and thinking about the tragic things
that they had witnessed and/or done, their probability of getting injured or killed, or the
uncomfortable climate which many found themselves in. Steckel argues that U.S. soldiers
“endured the horrors of combat through the sustaining bonds of loyalty, feeling of security, and
sense of unit pride instilled by long service as part of a cohesive group.” 43 Shils and Janowitz
similarly contend that German soldiers’ “determined resistance” was a result of the close bond
formed between soldiers as they “jointly experienced gratifications” and as they became more
isolated from their “civilian primary groups.” 44 These relationships were significant because of
the mental impact that they had on soldiers, as comrades motivated men in battle and helped
them to endure the struggles that came with combat. As one Army combat veteran put it, “You
know the men in your outfit. You have to be loyal to them. The men get close-knit
together…They depend on each other – wouldn’t do anything to let the rest of them down.
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They’d rather get killed than do that. They begin to think the world of each other. It’s the main
thing that keeps a guy from going haywire.” 45
Guy Sajer similarly expressed his reliance on comrades, recalling, “I was sick of the
whole thing. My stomach was turning over and felt cold. I look for Hals or some other friend,
but couldn’t see any familiar faces… their absence weighed on me. I felt very much
alone…trying to find some excuse of hope and encouragement.” 46 Although Sajer describes a
brief period after a battle that he could not find his comrades, his account displays how heavily
many Wehrmacht soldiers relied on one another to endure the struggles brought about by
combat. An anonymous Wehrmacht soldier put it more simply, claiming, “Many times my
nerves want to get the better of me. Then you think you must throw all the crap away, you can’t
hold on any longer, and only in the circle of comrades, with a glass of beer can you again find
diversion.” 47 Comrades were there for one another during what was, for many, the most
demanding time of their lives both mentally and physically. Soldiers were away from family and
friends, many for the first time, in a hostile environment where death could come upon them at
any moment. They had no one to lean on except for the man in the foxhole next to them. Under
these conditions, comrades became the primary element that kept soldiers motivated throughout
their time on the frontlines.

45

Unknown, in Stouffer, The American Soldier, 136.

46

Sajer, The Forgotten Soldier, 250.

47

Letter of Anonymous Soldier (18 May, 1941), quoted in Fritz, Frontsoldaten, 166.

19
Officers
Officers played a strong role in the motivation of American and Wehrmacht soldiers
during World War II because their unique, authoritative position allowed them to have a
significant effect on the morale of combat troops. However, whether officers had a positive or
negative effect on morale depended on their ability to obtain the trust and respect of their troops,
both of which were correlated to an officer’s experience on the battlefield and how well they led
their men during combat. As the War dragged on, American officers who had experienced
combat in previous campaigns, typically non-commissioned officers (NCOs), were respected far
more than junior officers, also known as commissioned officers (COs). In fact, when a study by
Stouffer asked a group of American combat veterans to “pick out some man who you would say
was one of the best combat soldiers you have known,” only ten-percent selected a CO, while
fifty-five percent selected an NCO and thirty-four percent selected a private or private first-class
(PFC). 48 This is because newly commissioned officers coming in from the States typically
entered leadership positions prior to their baptism of fire. On the other hand, in the Wehrmacht
“nearly all non-commissioned and commissioned officers of the company grade level were
regarded by the German soldier throughout the Western campaign as brave, efficient, and
considerate.” 49 This was the case until the final few months of the War, when the Wehrmacht
rushed men into combat as it became desperate for troops and German defeat seemed imminent.
A soldier in the U.S. Army became a CO either by graduating from a military college or Officer
Candidate School (OCS), while officers in the Wehrmacht went through a Kriegschule, a
military war school similar to OCS.
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Stouffer argues that there were two ways an officer in the U.S. Army gained informal
power to influence and motivate soldiers. First, an officer had to prove, through past
experiences, to be “a source of guidance and strength” for soldiers. Second, in order to gain the
respect and admiration of his men an officer must have “shared the dangers and hardships of the
men successfully.” 50 For enlisted soldiers who became NCOs, they typically had already proven
their leadership skills during training and in previous campaigns. As one replacement soldier
recalls, “We were in awe of [the veterans]…they were like heroes to us. And they were good,
furthermore they were good. We had good officers for the most part, but we had excellent NCOs
– they looked after you.” 51 On the other hand, newly commissioned junior officers had to prove
their leadership abilities to veteran soldiers during their initial combat experiences. In his
memoir Company Commander, Captain Charles MacDonald recalls the difficult task of taking
control of the veteran Company I as a twenty-one year old replacement CO. When “Mac” joined
Company I, many the unit’s soldiers had already seen action in France, beginning when they
stormed Normandy beach on D-Day plus one (June 7, 1944). After joining the company,
MacDonald remembers thinking, “They could boast a glorious combat record already and I knew
nothing…If only I knew what [combat] was like. It seemed incredible that his group of hardened
combat veterans could accept an inexperienced youth of twenty-one to lead them into battle
simply because he happened to come to them wearing a set of flashy bars on his shoulders.” 52
However, as was feared by MacDonald, it was difficult for junior officers to gain the respect of
veteran soldiers and the authoritative power necessary to positively motivate soldiers.
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For officers in the U.S. Army, gaining the respect of their troops came only after they
proved their leadership and combat abilities on the battlefield. NCOs typically had the respect of
their men, as those under their command had either fought beside them during previous
campaigns or were replacement soldiers that admired their combat experience. Contrarily, COs
who were unable to display such leadership ability as they entered veteran units not only failed to
gain the respect of their men, but also risked decreasing overall morale. Charles Gates, a
member of the 761st Tank Battalion – the first black tanker group to be used in combat – recalls
one colonel of an infantry regiment. According to Gates, “All the combat experience he had was
as a finance officer back in the United States. He didn’t know a thing about combat.” After
suffering one fatality and losing a few other men to injuries, Gates decided to ignore the colonel
and began giving orders himself, claiming “I could give less than a damn what their rank is.” 53
Major Dick Winters of Easy Company even remembers a period during the Battle of the Bulge
when “I looked at the junior officers and my company commanders and I grinded my teeth.” 54
During the company’s attempt to capture the German town of Foy, Easy Company began taking
a high number of casualties as leadership began to fail. 55 Lieutenant Norman Dike, a CO who
had recently been assigned commander of Easy Company, was leading the assault when he
began panicking and making heedless, dangerous decisions. It was then that battalion
commander Winters ordered Lieutenant Ronald Spiers – a well respect NCO who had seen
action in Normandy and Holland – to “take over the company and relieve Dike.” 56 Dike’s
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failure to lead the company during combat resulted in distrust amongst his own company. First
sergeant C. Carwood Lipton expressed his concern about the junior officer’s leadership abilities,
bluntly telling Winters, “Lieutenant Dike is going to get a lot of [Easy] Company men killed.” 57
Lieutenant Dike and the CO described by Gates are just two examples of the negative impact that
officers, particularly inexperienced junior officers, could have on combat units.
Whether an NCO or a CO, officers who led by example were the ones that gained the
trust and respect of their men and, as a result, positively motivated soldiers on the frontlines. As
one U.S. Army Lieutenant noted, “In combat you have to be out in front leading them, not
directing them from the rear. The men say, ‘If the officer’s going to stay back a hundred yards,
then I’m going to stay back with him.’ You can’t direct them – you have to lead them.” 58
Winters similarly asserted, “If you’re a leader, you lead the way. Not just on the easy ones, you
take the tough ones too.” 59 In fact, in one study performed by Stouffer on veteran infantrymen,
the largest percentage of men surveyed claimed leading by example to be the “officer leadership
practice” that that most increased their confidence during “tough or frightening situation(s).” 60
For officers, leading by example nearly always meant putting themselves in harm’s way. D-Day
veteran Sergeant Warner Hamlett recalled a tremendous display of leadership by an officer on
the beaches of Normandy as a group of soldiers was pinned down behind a seawall. Despite the
“deafening roar of explosions and bullets,” Lieutenant Wise of F-Company continued “directing
his team behind the seawall, when a bullet hit him in the forehead. He continued to instruct his
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men until he sat down and held his head in the palm of his hand before falling over dead.” 61
Despite his death, it was officers like Lieutenant Wise who led by example – often putting
themselves in harm’s way during battle – that gained the trust and respect of their men. The
NCOs and COs who were able to do so had a significant, positive impact on group morale and
motivated their soldiers to follow suit.
Wehrmacht officers had a similar impact on the combat motivation of troops under their
command. However, soldiers in the Wehrmacht tended to have a stronger regard, or even “a
fixation,” on both NCOs and COs. 62 As a matter of fact, in a questionnaire of German prisoners
of war (POWs), Wehrmacht soldiers claimed two-thirds of their junior officers had been “good,”
and gave NCOs a seventy-five percent approval rating. 63 The approval rating of junior officers –
much higher than COs in the U.S. Army – is partly due to the fact that “the junior officers of the
Wehrmacht were, in general, very well selected. They were better educated than the average
German and had received extensive preliminary training.” This is contrary to many COs in the
American Army who were rushed through OCS because replacements were needed in combat
units. Even so, similar to the U.S. Army, NCOs “were everywhere appreciated as the most solid
asset of the Wehrmacht.” 64 Nevertheless, as former Wehrmacht soldier Hans Werner
Woltersdorf noted in his memoir Gods of War, every CO and NCO “who led a unit had to be the
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best man in his unit as well; not the uniform, not being in command, but example made the
leader.” 65
As Woltersdorf mentions, like the U.S. Army, it was Wehrmacht officers who led by
example that gained the respect of their men and increased soldiers’ willingness to fight.
Michael Schu was a Wehrmacht soldier who constantly expressed admiration for one of his
lieutenants, claiming that he was “a great guy” who “was always at the front.” 66 However,
leading by example to gain trust and respect necessarily meant putting themselves in danger. As
is mentioned by Robert Citino, “if there is one thing we can say with assurance about German
officers, it is that they were absolutely fearless, and they proved it by leading from the front and
dying in great numbers.” 67 Along with showing leadership in battle, it was important to
Wehrmacht soldiers that their officers were strong in character. Specifically, they admired
officers who embodied and balanced the ideas and values of the Wehrmacht, which had been
engrained in soldiers during training. These included Gemeinschaft, feelings of superiority over
enemies, and toughness. In fact, officers were specifically trained to emphasize these values. As
is mentioned by Frevert, “Established officers too received reminders that comradeship did not
only stop with the rank of Lieutenant, but ought to be extended to the troops, who all deserved
the same comradely treatment.” This meant that officers were to be cautious when it came to
beating down on soldiers in their unit, as many of these men needed to be “schooled” and
“led.” 68 The presence of such officers “provided models for weaker men” and helped facilitate
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new soldiers into the Wehrmacht and their individual units. 69 Friedrich Grupe spoke in high
regard of one sergeant who constantly screamed at and pushed soldiers to their physical limits,
but who also understood the importance of comradeship. Grupe wrote, “I will not soon forget
my drill instructor, ‘big mouth’ Schmidt, as he shooed us up the heights of the training
area…[But] in the evenings ‘big-mouth’ Schmidt comes into the barracks room, sits informally
with us, and laughs and jokes and sings with us just like a good comrade.” 70 Therefore, it was
officers who led by example and carried out the ideas and values of the Wehrmacht on and off
the battlefield that gained the admiration of their men. Officers who had this admiration were
able to motivate their men to continue fighting throughout the war.

Institutional Punishment
Although officers were encouraged to breed unit cohesiveness, officers and the higher
institutional authority of the Wehrmacht often used coercive measures to prevent desertion and
intimidate soldiers into fighting. Wehrmacht soldiers knew that the alternative to fighting was to
desert their comrades, which put them at risk of becoming a POW – which was a terrifying
thought for those on the Eastern front – or of receiving punishment from higher authorities. As
is mentioned by Kershaw, “German soldiers, in particular, could expect no mercy from their own
side for refusal to fight, or for desertion.” 71 Soldiers who lost their weapons in a retreat, were
caught stealing, or were deemed guilty of desertion or Wehrkraftzertzung – “undermining the
fighting spirit of the troops” – often faced execution, or were sent to the “punishment battalion.”
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The punishment battalion was “widely feared and resented as a virtual death sentence” because
its tasks included searching for and clearing mines and burying the dead under enemy fire. 72
Furthermore, the Wehrmacht was not afraid to make an example out of its own men by executing
criminals and deserters. Former soldier Helmut Altner insists, “There were only two
possibilities. Death by bullet from the enemy or by the ‘thugs’ of the SS.” 73 However, SS
soldiers were not always the executioners. In fact, officers were instructed “not to refrain from
using their weapons” against their own men if necessary. 74 One “special order” by a German
division stated, “Lance-Corporal Aigner…was sentenced to death by court martial on the charge
of cowardice…Although he had seen his unit marching forward, he entered a house, drank a
bottle of schnapps…and fled to the rear without cap or weapon, where he was seized in this
ragged and drunken condition. Every case of cowardice will be severely atoned for with death.
The troops are to be instructed on this by the company commander personally.” 75 Omer Bartov
estimates that “at least 15,000 German soldiers were executed” by the Wehrmacht during the
Second World War and that “many more were shot on the spot while trying to cross over to the
enemy, fleeing in panic, or simply failing to carry out orders on the battlefield.” 76 Executions
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became more customary as the war dragged on, as the Wehrmacht attempted to keep its soldiers
fighting even when defeat was imminent.
Although penalties were extremely harsh and rarely justifiable, the Wehrmacht’s goal of
using punishments to instill fear in its men was, overall, a success. In fact, the fear of
punishment, especially execution, was a form of motivation for soldiers to continue fighting.
Bartov argues that the fear of disciplinary actions not only “played a major role in preventing any
large-scale revolts and in keeping the majority of men at the front…[but also] both encouraged
compliance with combat discipline and enhanced the troops‘ sense of a common destiny, purpose
and guilt.” 77 Guy Sajer admits that “fear of…the [punishment] battalion” kept soldiers on the
front line. 78 He also recalls the effect that executions could have on men: “Two sacks were
dangling from [a tree]…suspended by two short lengths of rope. We walked under them, and
saw the gray, bloodless faces of hanged men, and recognized our wretched friend Frösch and his
companion…Lindberg hid his face in his hands and wept.” 79 With executions and other
disciplinary action so widespread, even among comrades, soldiers understood that they were not
exempt from such punishments. As a result, soldiers like Sajer were typically unwilling to risk
desertion or committing other punishable offenses, which meant that they remained on frontlines
even when German victory was unlikely.
In addition to receiving punishment from institutional authority, soldiers who failed to
embrace the values of the Wehrmacht – especially comradeship and toughness – faced informal
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reprimand from their peers. As is mentioned by Shils and Janowitz, “For those for whom their
charisma did not suffice and who were accordingly difficult to incorporate fully into the intimate
primary group, frowns, harsh words, and threats served as to check on divisive tendencies.” 80 In
a letter written to his parents during Wehrmacht training in 1944, a sixteen-year-old, among
those rushed into the Wehrmacht towards the end of the war, wrote, “I have a request of you. I
got my pocket knife stolen, perhaps you could get a hold of one somewhere…Then could you
send me some writing paper, I still had some in my pack, but now it is gone…P.S. I lost my
watch.” 81 Although the boy does not specify why his things were stolen, it seems that his peers
were picking on him because they perceived that his age made him inferior to themselves. His
youth meant that he lacked manliness and toughness, two things which were celebrated in the
Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, comradeship was embraced so universally throughout the Wehrmacht
– instilled through training, battle, and frontline hardships – that informal punishments were
uncommon and relatively unnecessary until the end of the war. In fact, because comradeship
was a primary motivation for soldiers during training and combat, isolation from peers was
widely feared. One soldier expressed “how totally alone…a man is placed here immediately on
the front,” and that “there is no relying anymore on your own strength or the power of your
weapons,” so a man must turn to his comrades. 82 For soldiers in the Wehrmacht, isolation from
their peers meant isolation from the only personal contacts that were able “to lessen the feeling
of loneliness.” 83 As was mentioned prior, one anonymous soldier admitted that it is “only in the
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circle of your comrades and with a glass of beer can you again find a diversion.” 84 Therefore,
fear of formal and informal punishment motivated many German soldiers to continue fighting
because the alternatives to doing so – brutal punishment from higher authorities and isolation by
their comrades – were viewed as worse.
On the other hand, fear of formal punishment from officers and institutional authority
was less of a motivating factor for soldiers in the U.S. Army. American soldiers were not as
affected by threat of punishment because the penalties given by the Army were much less severe
than those carried out by the Wehrmacht. Unlike German soldiers, “the combat man did not in
fact face a choice of possible death if he refused combat.” 85 In fact, Under Secretary of War
Robert Patterson declared in 1945, “During the entire length of this war, the Army has executed
102 of its soldiers. All executions but one were for murder or rape. One was for desertion, the
first execution for a purely military crime since the Civil War.” 86 This is an incredibly small
number when compared with the estimated fifteen-thousand executions that were carried out by
the Wehrmacht. Private Donald Slovik was the one American soldier executed for desertion
during WWII; shot on January 31, 1945. According to Aaron and Peggy Saagri, Slovik’s
execution was an effort by General Dwight D. Eisenhower “to stop American troops from
deserting…Eisenhower hoped that by making an example of Slovik, the desertion rate would
decrease.” 87 In fact, in a letter to General Eisenhower, Assistant Judge Advocate General E.C.
McNeil acknowledges that “the sentence adjudged was more severe than [Slovik] had
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anticipated, but the imposition of a less severe sentence would only” lead Slovik and other
deserters to feel that they were “[free] from the dangers which so many of our armed forces are
required to face daily.” 88 With the U.S. fighting at the Battle of the Bulge at the time and taking
heavy casualties, Slovik’s sentence was meant to motivate men to remain on the line as opposed
to deserting or going Absent Without Leave (AWOL) – failing to show up for a given duty.
However, the effect that one execution could have on an entire American Army was limited. In
fact, Alvin “Tommy” Bridges, former military policeman (MP), claims that the only effect
Slovik’s execution and other executions for “minor things” had on him was greater discontent
toward the Army: “That’s what burns me up…The son-of-a-bitches.” 89
Although executions were rare, there were other punishments and informal factors
attached to these punishments that allowed coercive authority to play a minor role in motivating
U.S. soldiers. If a soldier was accused of deserting his unit or of going AWOL, he faced a trial
by court-martial. Although punishments varied between divisions, those most commonly handed
down to soldiers who had gone AWOL were “dismissal and total forfeitures,” meaning a
dishonorable discharge from service and “a total forfeit of allowances due or to become due.” 90
On the other hand, if a soldier was found guilty of deserting or attempting to desert service, they
were typically sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures, and “hard labor for life” at
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a penitentiary in the United States. 91 However, Stouffer argues that it was the “informal factors”
attached to these sanctions that most influenced soldiers to remain on the line. According to
Stouffer, there were three informal factors attached to coercive sanctions: “the fear of losing pay,
family allotments, etc…, family ties and the reactions of a man’s buddies were involved in the
feeling that being convicted and confided was a disgrace, [and] a man’s own established reaction
to punishments” including varying degrees of shame and guilt. 92
Contrary to Stouffer’s assertion, although money may have been a concern for men when
they left combat, losing pay and family allotments were not a significant motivating factor for
soldiers fighting for their lives. As was mentioned previously, soldiers on the frontlines were
primarily concerned about their immediate circumstances and survival. Similar to ideology and
patriotism, monetary benefits were not of primary concern for soldiers like Bill Guernere, who
were just “trying to get through the next phase [and] the next phase” alive. 93 Nevertheless, as is
argued by Stouffer, guilt and shame were likely factors keeping men from going AWOL or
deserting because both actions would damage the only social connection that they had at the
time: their comrades. As is mentioned by Marshall, “personal honor is the one thing [soldiers’
value] more than life itself,” and they loathed the idea of failing or expressing fear in front of
their comrades because it was considered ‘cowardice.’” 94 Veteran Robert Rasmus explains the
importance of this connection, stating, “The reason you storm the beaches…is that sense of not
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wanting to fail your buddies. There’s sort of a special sense of kinship.” 95 Even with the role of
these informal factors, the threat of punishment from higher authority had a much less significant
effect in keeping soldiers on the frontline than those of the Wehrmacht. As was mentioned by
Bridges, “Toward the end of the war, they wasn’t a guy in any of those outfits, black or white,
that wouldn’t go AWOL. They had a damn hard job keepin’ those guys up in front as they did
winnin’ a war.” 96 Institutional authority of the U.S. Army played a role in motivating soldiers,
but it had a more minor role than the authority of the Wehrmacht. This was due to the fact that
the U.S. Army used much less severe authoritative and coercive measures, relying more so on
the informal factors attached to punishments.

German War Crimes & Fear of the Enemy
For many Wehrmacht soldiers, even those on the Western front, hatred and fear of the
Red Army motivated many to continue fighting to the very end. As is argued by Ian Kershaw,
soldiers genuinely feared that losing the war meant facing a “vengeful victory” at the hands of
the Soviets, who “would surely bring the destruction of all they hold dear.” 97 German soldiers
feared that the troops of the Red Army would seek revenge for the multitude of atrocities that
Wehrmacht soldiers – not just the SS – committed on the Soviet civilian populace. However,
these atrocities were not limited to Soviet populations. Historian Karl-Heinz Schoeps focuses on
the mass murder of Jews and Communists in the Jewish ghetto of Vilnius, claiming, “while
many soldiers of the Wehrmacht were disgusted by the crimes committed by the Einsatzgruppen
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(the SS), only very few of them came to the aid of those persecuted by the SS.” 98 In this case,
although some soldiers were “disgusted” by the atrocities committed and may not have been the
ones pulling the trigger, the Wehrmacht was not exempt from committing war crimes. In fact,
Robert Citino argues, “The notion that the army fought a clean fight, while the Waffen-SS
carried out battlefield atrocities and the SS-Einsatzgruppen (“SS action teams”) shot civilians
wholesale, is no longer credible. The German army murdered its way east, then did so again as it
fought its way back west.” 99 Omer Bartov even claims, “As long as they fought well, the
soldiers were allowed to ‘let off steam’ both by transgressing accepted civilian norms of
behavior and by acting illegally even according to the far from ‘normal’ standards of the
front.” 100 Of course, there were some Wehrmacht soldiers who rebelled against these atrocities
but these were a minute few. In fact, Kershaw asserts that the number “who behaved so nobly
has been estimated at perhaps a hundred…compared with the figure of over 18 million who
served in the Wehrmacht.” 101
The atrocities committed by Wehrmacht soldiers include, but are not limited to, mass
murder, rape, armed robbery, and indiscriminate shooting. Many soldiers justified their
participation in these atrocities with racial and ideological convictions. According to Kershaw,
what many soldiers “thought they were fighting for amounted to an opaque vision of a future
utopia, a ‘new order’ in which German racial superiority and dominance over crushed enemies
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would guarantee their families and descendants peace and prosperity.” 102 One soldier justified
his participation in a mass execution of Jews, claiming, “Partisans are enemies and blackguards
must vanish.” 103 Some of this hatred derived from National Socialist ideology, but the brutality
of the war on the Eastern front only increased resentment and the desire for revenge between the
German and Soviet forces. Wehrmacht soldier Matthew Jung recalls one instance when Russian
civilians killed eighteen German soldiers. According to Jung, “The whole place, everything [was
destroyed]! Totally! The civilians who had done it, all the civilians who were in the place. In
each corner stood a machine gun, and then all the houses were set on fire and whoever came out
– In my opinion with justice!” 104 In addition, apart from racial and ideological motivations, it is
important to recall that soldiers faced brutal disciplinary consequences, often execution, if they
failed to comply with higher authorities. Nevertheless, at the very least, the majority of German
soldiers were complicit bystanders in war crimes as they “were aware of the atrocities committed
under their eyes.” 105 Soldier Herbet Selle recalls one execution of Jews in Zhitomir in 1941
when troops were “sitting on rooftops and platforms watching the show. The execution was
arranged as a form of popular entertainment.” 106 Another soldier stated, “We watched the show
and then went back to work, as if nothing had happened.” 107 Even if many soldiers were simply
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witnesses, the Wehrmacht was complicit and often played an active role in war atrocities
alongside the SS, particularly on the Eastern front.
The crimes and atrocities committed or witnessed by Wehrmacht soldiers kept men
fighting as they feared the vengeance of the Soviet forces in the case of defeat. Bartov claims
that these actions even had “a unifying element” as they “bound troops together by creating a
keen awareness of their shared responsibility of horrific crimes” and “the enemy’s vengeance in
the case of defeat.” 108 Citino put it more bluntly, asserting, “One thing that kept officers fighting
was their fear of the Red Army’s revenge if it broke into Germany. They knew exactly what
they had done to the Soviet Union and had good reason to be worried.” 109 As one Wehrmacht
soldier wrote, “May God grant us victory because if [the Soviets] get their revenge, we’re in for
a hard time.” 110 As a result of their fear of Soviet vengeance, soldiers were even relieved to
become American POWs. American soldier Richard Prendergast recalled his time in a German
POW camp: “a guard came in around midnight…He says, ‘The Russians are not far away. We
propose to pack up and take off toward the American lines…We need you for when we get to the
Americans, you can tell ‘em we didn’t treat you so bad.’ If the Russians ever found ‘em,
goodbye, Charlie.” 111 In addition, Erhard Dabringhaus, a military intelligence officer and
interrogator with the U.S. Army during WWII, remembers, “Whenever a German was especially
stubborn I’d always call Sergeant Kaminski. The German starts talkin’ at once. He knew
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Kaminski was a Polish name and he knew what they’d done to Warsaw.” 112 As a result of their
involvement in war crimes, Wehrmacht soldiers were motivated to continue fighting to the very
end, or until they were able to surrender American forces. Like the soldier mentioned by
Prendergast, Wehrmacht soldiers understood that the American Army, in contrast to the Red
Army, would treat ordinary German soldiers somewhat humanely and refrain from using torture
or taking other vengeance-seeking actions.
Americans did not hold the same hatred and fear toward the German Army as Wehrmacht
soldiers did toward Soviets, and vice versa. After all, it was not American lands that the
Wehrmacht had pillaged, houses that they had burned, civilians whom they had executed, or
women whom they had raped. Stouffer similarly indicates that the American combat soldier
“had not, like the Russians, seen his country devastated and his family perhaps wiped out in cold
blood. Neither had he, like the British, seen his home cities bombed and his country’s national
existence hanging by a thread.” 113 Still, there were a number of American soldiers who
expressed utter hatred and disgust toward the Germans. After witnessing a small portion of
German war atrocities when his unit liberated the Buchenwald concentration camp in 1945,
veteran Timuel Black recalls, “I got more passionately angry than I guess I’d ever been. I said,
‘Let’s kill all the sons-of-a-bitches. Kill all the goddamn Germans. Anyone who would do this
to people, they’re not worth livin.’’” 114 In the heat of the war, one American soldier even called
for the “complete extermination of the German people.” 115 Angry and disgruntled feelings were
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especially directed toward elite German forces, most notably the SS. As is mentioned by Studs
Terkel, “The SS were, of course another matter. Even the most gentle and forgiving of our GIs
found few redeeming attributes there.” 116 Elliot Johnson expressed similar feelings, recalling.
“The SS. They were elite. They were so brainwashed they were impossible to reason with.
Those people made me angry.” 117
Despite these reactions, most Americans on the Western front tried to suppress any
emotions toward ordinary Wehrmacht soldiers, and to killing in general. In fact, as the war went
along and American troops came in contact with German forces, they began to acknowledge that
they were fighting against an army of young men who were not much different from themselves.
One American paratrooper recalls this change in feelings, stating, “I think we thought that the
Germans were probably the most evilest people in the world. But, as the war went along, we
found out also that it was not the [German soldiers] per say. It was the SS and special troops.” 118
Dee Carl Perguson Jr., a college educated infantry man fighting in Italy, even wrote, “I sensed
that we shared a common sense of humanity and a common tragedy…Although the U.S. army
had trained me to kill, it had not trained me to hate.” 119 Veteran Elliot Johnson explained this
feeling in more depth, claiming, “We recognized that we were at war, but we recognized that
[the German soldiers] came from families like we came from families and that they had loved
ones and they were good guys and they were bad guys. We were called on by our government,
that our country was in jeopardy. Therefore, we had to fight for it. Personally, I had no malice
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at any time toward the Germans.” 120 Robert Rasmus similarly remembers, “Looking at the
individual German dead, each took on a personality. These were no longer an abstraction.
These were no longer the Germans of the brutish faces and the helmets we saw in the newsreels.
They were exactly our age. These were boys just like us…Once the helmet is off, you’re looking
at a teen-ager, another kid.” 121 Despite what they had been told or the propaganda that they had
seen, this was the feeling of most U.S. soldiers toward ordinary German soldiers once they faced
combat. Regardless of how they may have felt toward the Germans entering the war, American
soldiers, overall, respected and understood that the majority of Wehrmacht soldiers were in a
similar position as themselves. Therefore, fear and the desire for vengeance toward the enemy
had much less significant roles in motivating American soldiers as they did for German soldiers.

Ending the Task & the Home Front
Once American soldiers experienced the horrors of combat, the majority simply wanted
to get the War over with and return home to their families. Many understood that by the time the
U.S. entered the war, Hitler’s Army was on the retreat and Allied victory was probable. As the
U.S. Army began to march across France, veteran artillery man Elliott Johnson recalls, “The
ordinary Germans, the boys we took prisoner, were so glad to be out of it…The last thing they’d
do is come back and either shake hands with us or embrace us.” 122 This reaction is likely
because many German Landsers had already withstood horrific combat conditions on the Eastern
front by the time the U.S. made its run across France, and they feared that they would be
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captured by the Soviets. An additional number of these soldiers were among the young and old
replacements thrown into combat by the Wehrmacht at the end of the war. With the end of the
war in sight, the typical American soldier simply wanted to “do their job” and return home to
their loved ones. In fact, in one study performed by Stouffer, thirty-nine percent of enlisted
soldiers cited “ending the task” as the most important incentive that made them “want to keep
going and do as well as you could,” fifteen-percent higher than the next leading category. 123 C.
Carwood Lipton of E Company, 101st Airborne explains, “when men are in combat, the
inevitability of it takes over. They are there, there is nothing they can do to change that, so they
accept that…There is still work to be done, a war to be won, and they think about that.” 124
David Webster explained the necessity of his job as a paratrooper more simply in a letter to his
mother, “Somebody has to get in and kill the enemy. Somebody has to be in the infantry and the
paratroopers.” 125 The necessity of performing one’s job was motivation for soldiers because,
aside from getting wounded, it was viewed as the key to returning home to their families and
ending the war.
Unlike American soldiers, German soldiers did not express doing their job and ending the
task as constant motivation. However, word from friends and family at home, most often
through letters, were morale boosters for soldiers seeking to grasp a world outside of the front.
Combat soldier Harry Mielert wrote in 1943, “A few lines can throw a rosy, invigorating light in
this desolate realm…When I think of October-November 1941, where we occasionally would go
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a week without receiving mail, how did we hold out?” 126 Martin Pöppel similarly noted that
mail delivery “cheers everyone to no end” as home is “made reality again by letters.” 127
However, when German cities became the victim of the Ally powers’ aerial bombardments,
soldiers’ homes became “a real front” which only “piled another layer of concern on top of the
Landsers’ almost insurmountable daily struggle just to stay alive.” 128 Writing from the Russian
front in 1942, Jürgeb Mogk expressed the anxiety he felt about “the home front”: “A third year
of the Russian campaign looms, but that means nothing when one considers the wider future. It
is not the insufficient bread that is wearing down the German people, but rather something far
more terrible: the bombardment of German cities by the English! Each of us would rather go
hungry than lose his house and home, and yes his loved ones” 129 Therefore, thoughts of home
and returning to loved ones acted as similar fighting motivation for German soldiers as it had for
American soldiers. However, American soldier’s motivation primarily derived from the
achievable prospect of ending the war and doing so quickly, while the end of the war was never
very much in the Wehrmacht’s grasp. Furthermore, the destruction of German cities and towns
by Ally attacks made word from home only a demoralizing aspect for many Wehrmacht soldiers
toward the end of the war.
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The Role of Alcohol
Although often ignored, the consumption of alcohol played a significant role in easing
soldiers’ fears and anxieties following battle, despite this being a punishable offense in both
armies. In addition, alcohol was a form of “liquid courage” for some soldiers who consumed it
prior to or during battle maneuvers. Michael C.C. Adams claims that the result of an American
army that “tried to keep its ranks dry…was an army obsessed with obtaining booze. Whiskey
became a form of currency, with a fixed value in trading for other items.” 130 Elliot Johnson
remembers “one colonel who was a great instructor. He helped a lot of us. But he couldn’t take
combat. Long before we ever landed, he was just stoned out of his mind. He came walking by,
hanging on to his command car because he was so drunk.” In fact, Johnson himself almost lost
his life trying to obtain alcohol. He recalls, “I had to cross a road and I was already learning
about the German 88. You could tell from the sound when it was pointed at you. I heard this
chok! And I knew it was mine. I was right in the middle of this road. I gave a dive over this
hedgerow and went straight down into a moat all covered with green slime. That killed any
desire I had for wine.” 131 Some soldiers even consumed alcohol when on the move or during
battle. In fact, American veterans, like Paul Fussell, have claimed that soldiers in the European
theatre had canteens that contained alcohol almost as much as they did water. 132 Veteran Joe
Hanley acknowledges that his drinking habit began after losing “many, many buddies” including
one of his best friends in the service who “died in my arms.” Hanley admits, “I never drank
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before I went into the service. But after walking from Marseilles to the Rhine River, most of it
on my belly, I got to the point that my canteen never contained water. Always cognac, the best
that I could find. I lived on cognac.” 133 The consumption of alcohol to ease anxiety, fear, and
battlefield memories, as described by Hanley, was not unique among American soldiers.
Nor was alcohol consumption unique throughout the Wehrmacht. Like American
soldiers, the German soldier consumed alcohol “to forget the war, the death and destruction all
around, the anxiety of his own fate” as well as “to summon courage for yet another day of
fighting.” 134 Guy Sajer acknowledges, “beer played an essential role” and vodka “is the easiest
way to make heroes…We drank everything we could get hold of, trying to blot out the memory
of a hideous day.” 135 In addition, like Johnson, German soldiers would go to deadly lengths to
obtain alcohol of any kind. Harry Mielert recalls a Russian military bombardment, noting,
“Everything rumbled, blazed, trembled. Cattle cried, soldiers searched through all the buildings,
barrels of red wine were taken away in small panje wagons, here and there men were drinking
and singing, in the meantime explosions again and new roaring fires.” 136 As these soldiers
admit, alcohol kept both American and German soldiers fighting by blocking out dreadful
memories of combat and, for some soldiers, acting as liquid courage during battle.
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Combat Exhaustion, Replacements, and Unit Rotation
In addition to factors that kept American and German soldiers motivated on the
frontlines, there were a number of aspects which negatively impacted morale and, consequently,
decreased soldiers’ drive to fight. Combat exhaustion was a prominent feature in both armies
which had a significant, negative impact on morale. Following World War II, it became
universally acknowledged that every soldier has a “breaking point” at which they can become
mentally overwhelmed with the strains of combat. As psychiatrist Simon Wessely points out,
with World War II “opinion shifted away from a belief in prevention [of combat exhaustion] to
the view that ‘every man has his breaking point.’” Studies began to show “a robust link between
the number of physical and psychiatric casualties. As one increased, so did the other.” 137 One
such study on combat exhaustion undertaken by the U.S. Army found, “There is no such thing as
‘getting used to combat.’ Each moment of combat imposes a strain so great that men will
breakdown in direct relation to the intensity and duration of their exposure…psychiatric
casualties are as inevitable as gunshot and shrapnel wounds in warfare.” 138 American and
German soldiers who were left on the frontlines for extended periods of time, witnessing and
withstanding horrific violence and brutal weather conditions, were especially prone to
exhaustion.
In the U.S. Army, there were a large number of soldiers who experienced combat
exhaustion. This can partially be attributed to a poor unit rotation system that kept entire units in
combat for extended periods. As Francis Steckel points out, “With little unit rotation, men faced
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prolonged periods of danger, physical exertion, emotional anxiety, and mental stress without rest
or relaxation.” 139 Longer periods on the frontline meant more exposure to physical danger,
killing and violence, and poor living conditions along with deprivation of the physical and
mental rest that they needed to recover before returning to combat. The U.S. Army’s study on
combat exhaustion previously mentioned, found, “Most men were ineffective after 180 or even
140 days [of combat]. The general consensus was that a man reached his peak of effectiveness
in the first 90 days of combat, that after that his efficiency began to fall off, and that he became
steadily less valuable thereafter until he was completely useless.” 140 Despite this report, combat
units were kept on the frontline well beyond ninety days. Easy Company, for example, spent
116 days on the frontline in its first three campaigns alone – Normandy, Holland, and
Belgium. 141 One wounded Infantry man, whose unit was on the frontline for forty-seven
consecutive days, described men who suffered from combat exhaustion: “Sometimes they
pushed a fellow so long, they are too tired before they even start fighting. They don’t give a
damn whether they get killed or not. They lose courage…They’re scared alright but they don’t
care.” 142 The General War Board of the United States Army in the European theatre even
acknowledged that the Army had an insufficient number of combat units which kept men on the
frontline for as long as possible. In a report conducted in 1945, the Board acknowledged,
“Under the former operation of the replacement system, divisions fought until losses so depleted
their ranks that they were incapable of further sustained action…During World War II, it was
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decided to provide a lesser number of divisions and maintain these divisions at fighting strength
by a constant flow of replacements in proportion to battle losses.” 143 A lack in unit rotation due
to an insufficient number of combat units amplified risks of combat exhaustion and,
consequently, decreased morale for those units who remained on the frontline for extended
periods.
Motivation was so hindered by combat exhaustion that non-fatal wounds became
welcomed. Soldiers were so desperate to get off the front as their time in combat increased that
they viewed wounded comrades as “lucky,” referring to a non-fatal injury as a “million-dollar
wound.” 144 Paratrooper David Webster gloomily wrote, “the only way out [of the Army] is to be
wounded or evacuated.” Recalling an artillery shelling in Veghel, Holland, Webster describes,
“I felt sick inside. I said I’d give a foot to be out of that place. We smelled the gunpowder as a
rancid thunderhead enveloped our hole…Three more. And then three, and then three. No
wonder men got combat exhaustion.” 145 Dick Winters even goes as far as to say, “When a man
was wounded, we felt glad for him, we felt happy for him. He had a ticket to get out of there,
and maybe a ticket to get home.” 146 It was continuous shellings like that described by Webster,
along with the other stresses of combat, that took a toll on soldiers mentally and physically,
decreasing morale throughout the U.S. Army. Moreover, self-inflicted wounds were common
amongst soldiers desperate for relief from fighting. Veteran Robert Rasmus affirmed, “I’m sure
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our company was typical. We had x percent of self-inflicted wounds. There’s no question that a
guy would blow his toe off to get out of combat.” 147 Instances like this were, in fact, “typical,”
especially as combat became more difficult to endure. American soldiers were especially prone
because of a unit rotation system that kept them in combat for extended periods with little to no
rest.
In addition to the rotation system, the U.S. Army’s replacement system was an
organizational issue that had a substantial, negative impact on the morale of combat units. The
replacement system assigned untried, poorly trained replacement soldiers to veteran combat units
without making significant efforts to implement these men into these units. Steckel similarly
mentions, “there was seldom time for thorough training in scouting, patrolling, night combat
operations, first aid, and all the other skills in which the replacements were typically
deficient.” 148 The General War Board reports,
…the replacement system as operated proved costly in lives. Faced with continuing
missions even after sustaining heavy losses and with no reserve of manpower, divisions
were forced to commit replacements to front line action the moment they passed to
division control. As a result many recruits were killed or seriously wounded before they
knew their squad mates or their commander; before they were inculcated with their unit's
history or esprit, and most important, before they had absorbed the battle lore necessary
for survival. 149
As this report indicates, a result of this insufficient replacement system, there were a high
number of casualties among new soldiers entering combat units. In fact, Steckel estimates that
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“more than half the replacements sent directly into combat became casualties in the first few
days of fighting.” 150
High casualty rates among replacements can be attributed to a failure to properly
incorporate replacements into their new units – specifically insufficient training, little to no time
to learn from experienced veterans, and failure to build the comradeship that was so vital for
combat motivation. Veteran Clifford Snyder, a replacement himself, admits, “It was very hard”
to make a replacement part of the unit. “‘Cause war is so different from training…they came in
so fast…you try to encourage the guys who have experience to work with these guys…but once
they got experience, you know, once they got fired at a few times, then they realized what the
situation was.” 151 However, many replacements did not make it through their first combat
missions to gain this experience. Referencing his time in the 83rd division of the 330th infantry,
Snyder recalls, “We had a lot of replacements that, after a while, I never really learned many first
names. I just knew the last name. They’d be here today and gone tomorrow, you know? But the
division had over 11,000 casualties during the war. I think there was close to 3,000 that were
killed.” 152 It was not uncommon that experienced soldiers, like Snyder, failed to offer the same
comradeship to new replacements as they had developed with their fellow veterans. This was
because of disdain toward replacements but, rather, for their personal well-being. Paratrooper
Earl McClung admitted, “I got [to the point] where I didn’t want to be friendly with
replacements coming in because, God, I didn’t like seeing them get killed. It just tore me up…I
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don’t know why but they were the first ones killed.” 153 Replacements coming in had less
confidence partially because they lacked “the sustaining bonds of loyalty, feeling of security, and
sense of unit pride” which were so vital for combat motivation. 154 One replacement claimed,
“We want to feel that we are a part of something. As a replacement we are apart from
everything…You feel totally useless and unimportant…Being a replacement is just like being an
orphan. You are away from anybody you know and feel lost and lonesome.” 155 However, as
replacements endured and learned the ropes, they were implemented into combat units and
enjoyed the benefits of comradery. Replacement Lester Hashey noted, “The ones that was there
at the very beginning, they are very close. And they accepted people like myself coming in as a
replacement. But you also had to prove yourself.” 156 Nevertheless, when replacements first
entered combat units, they had insufficient training and lacked the comradery that veteran
soldiers enjoyed, mostly due to a poor replacement system. This made it difficult for soldiers
entering combat units to gain the confidence and skills that they needed to survive their initial
combat experiences.
In addition, the U.S. Army’s replacement system was poorly designed in that wounded
veterans returning to combat were not always reimplemented into their original units. Rather, if
their unit had already been replenished with replacements, the U.S. Army policy shuffled these
soldiers into new combat units. This policy proved “disastrous because the desire of casualties to
return to combat stemmed largely from a sense of loyalty to one’s comrades and pride and one’s
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unit.” 157 Therefore, many of these men lost motivation to fight because they were not beside
their comrades – those who most motivated them to continue fighting. Marshall put it best,
claiming that wounded men assigned to different combat units were unwilling “to risk danger on
behalf of men with whom [they have] no social identity.” 158 Steckel, similarly contends “many
soldiers endured the horrors of combat through the sustaining bonds of loyalty, feeling of
security, and sense of unit pride instilled by long service as part of a cohesive group.” 159
Therefore, when wounded veterans were not returned to their original unit but were assigned to
new ones, their motivation to fight was hindered. In fact, wounded men were so desperate to
return to their comrades that it was not uncommon for these soldiers to go AWOL from military
hospitals in an attempt to link up with their unit if they believed that they would be placed in a
replacement depot. Jim Alley was one such soldier who went AWOL from the twelfth
Replacement Depot and hitched two separate rides from England to return to his company in
Mourmelon le Grande, France, just four days before they left for the Battle of the Bulge. 160
This was not the case in the Wehrmacht which, until the very end of the war, had a much
more efficient replacement and unit rotation system. Fritz describes the Wehrmacht replacement
system and how it differed from that of the U.S.: “the Army attempted to recruit and keep men
together from specific regions and even to supply replacements from the same area of the
country…Moreover, replacements never traveled to their units as individuals – as in the
American army – but as coherent groups….This practice gave divisions an incentive to look after
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their own replacements’ training, and replacements themselves could begin the process of
generating group loyalty even before they arrived at the front.” 161 Therefore, unlike the U.S.
Army, replacement soldiers were trained and looked after by veterans prior to and during
entering combat. In addition, they were placed in units with men who had similar roots as
themselves. This meant that replacements already had something in common with one another
and gave veterans an incentive for embracing their new comrades. Nevertheless, toward the end
of the war, the effectiveness of the Wehrmacht’s replacement system deteriorated.
The Wehrmacht, having suffered immense casualties on both fronts, became desperate
for fighting men toward the end of the war. As a result, combat units’ time on the frontlines
increased in duration and unqualified replacement soldiers, often under or over the typical ages
of combat men, were thrown into these units. Bartov argues that a “new sense of existential
comradeship” was formed toward the end of the war in place of “the old, more traditional
groups.” Soldiers, according to Bartov, continued to depend one another but a greater portion of
their motivation came from their belief that they had to fight for the good of their “family,
friends and relations, nation and culture.” 162 This may have been the case for a brief period, but
this feeling deteriorated after what Shils and Janowitz describe as “total mobilization” – when
units became comprised of “new recruits, dragooned stragglers, air force men who had been
forced into the infantry…men transferred from the navy into the infantry to meet the emergency
manpower shortage, old factory workers, concentration camp inmates, and older married men
who had been kept in reserve.” 163 U.S. Army surgeon Alex Schulman recalls performing
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surgery on one young recruit: “This German youngster was brought in. He was fourteen, fifteen.
Looked like a lost little boy. Hitler was takin’ the kids and the old men…As I took him to the
operating room, he started crying. A little kid.” 164 The German replacement system was much
more efficient than the American Army but only until the end of the war, when the Wehrmacht
began relying on poorly trained teenagers and older men to fight in combat units.
Despite having better replacement and rotation systems, Wehrmacht soldiers fought a
long war with horrific violence and brutal conditions, especially along the Eastern front. This
was able to drive any man to the brink of mental and physical exhaustion. Although the
Wehrmacht emphasized discipline and toughness, every Wehrmacht soldier was susceptible to
combat exhaustion, like men in the U.S. Army. As is argued by Fritz, “Despite the motivation
and self-discipline that spring from the tight-knit nature of the small Kameradschaft, and the
general high level of confidence and cohesion between officers and men, the prolonged stress
and dreadful casualties led almost inevitably to breakdown in these invisible threads of
discipline.” 165 Shils and Janowitz similarly acknowledge that even comradeship could not
sufficiently motivate soldiers “in situations where the tactical prospects were utterly hopeless,
under devastating artillery and air bombardments, or where basic food and medical requirements
were not being met.” 166 Guy Sajer describes combat exhaustion as he witnessed it: “When
danger…continues indefinitely, it becomes unbearable…After hours and then days of
danger…one collapses into unbearable madness, and a crisis of nerves is only the beginning.
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Finally, one vomits and collapses, entirely brutalized and inert, as if death had already won.” 167
One soldier fighting in Stalingrad even called his life at the time “a psychological monstrosity”
after destroying two Soviet tanks and witnessing one of the tank drivers on fire, “burning up to
his knees.” 168 Combat took such a toll on Wehrmacht soldiers that, for many men, death
appeared imminent and the world outside of war seemed nonexistent. In his final diary entry
before his death, Ewald H. wrote, “At any moment I am prepared. You see, I have seen life. I
can no longer experience the happiness and the misfortunes of this world. War, you monster,
this time you have crushed the whole earth.” 169 Max Aretin-Eggert similarly wrote, “we stagger
in a whirlpool…From the ‘outside’ no comfort and no relief and escape is possible…[for] one
doesn’t know if he is among the living or the dead.” 170 For fighters in the Wehrmacht, like
American soldiers, combat exhaustion was an inescapable threat that decreased soldiers’
motivation to fight. Soldiers could only take so much of life on the frontline – killing, artillery
attacks, loss of friends, and poor living conditions – before they began to breakdown. For many
combat veterans, injury or even death seemed more attractive alternatives than continuing to
fight.

167

Sajer, Forgotten Soldier, 261.
Anonymous soldier, quoted in Franz Schneider and Charles Gullans, eds. and trans.,
Last Letters from Stalingrad (Westport: Praeger, 1974), 111-112.
168

169

Ewald H., Diary entry of Ewald H, 17 November 1943, quoted in Fritz, Frontsoldaten,

170

Max Aretin-Eggert, Lettr of Maz Aretin-Eggert, quoted in Fritz, Frontsoldaten, 88.

88.

CONCLUSION
More links can be drawn between American and German soldiers of World War II than
has previously been acknowledged. They may have been on opposing sides of a war that meant
something very different for their governments, but American and Wehrmacht soldiers fighting
in the European theatre were motivated by many identical factors while facing similar obstacles
that decreased morale. Despite counter arguments from various historians, neither patriotism nor
ideology were common motivating factors for these soldiers. Rather, the American and German
soldier fighting for their life on the frontline were primarily focused on their immediate
circumstances and concerned with their survival. In their best attempt to survive, soldiers
constantly relied on the men with whom they had endured training and battle – their comrades.
Men leaned on their fellow soldiers when the war seemed too much to handle mentally and
physically, and they trusted that comrades would help safeguard their own survival. Therefore,
comrades were the primary factor that kept American and German soldiers motivated and
fighting throughout the Second World War.
In addition to their comrades were a number of secondary motivational factors. Despite a
general distrust among American soldiers for untried commissioned officers, officers played a
key role in motivating soldiers in both armies. As the leaders directing them throughout training
and battle, a soldier’s trust and respect for their officers was directly affected to their confidence
heading into combat. Trust in their own training and preparedness and that of their comrades
was also vital for confidence on the frontlines. Although training was grueling for many
soldiers, it proved essential once soldiers entered combat. After experiencing life on the
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frontline, soldiers in both armies would likely agree with the common Wehrmacht saying, “sweat
saves blood.” One may understand the consequences of under trained soldiers on unit morale by
examining the U.S. Army replacement system – undertrained and unprepared for combat,
replacements lacked confidence and veterans distrusted new soldiers entering their units. This
resulted in high casualty rates for replacement soldiers and diminished unit cohesion. The
Wehrmacht Army faced similar consequences when, toward the end of the war, it flooded
combat units with unqualified soldiers, many of whom were either teenagers or older men.
Thoughts of home also increased fighting motivation as American soldiers sought to do their job,
end the war, and return to home. Similarly, until Ally aerial bombardments increased anxiety
amongst soldiers, letters from home were crucial in boosting morale throughout the Wehrmacht.
Along with poor replacement systems, combat exhaustion was an extremely common occurrence
in both armies which significantly hindered combat motivation. Soldiers could only endure so
much combat and poor living conditions before their drive to fight was hampered. Combat
exhaustion played such a significant role that injury or even death seemed better alternatives for
soldiers desperate to escape the frontlines. It is also important to acknowledge one critical
motivating factor that distinguished Wehrmacht from American soldiers: hatred and fear of a
vengeful Red Army victory. This fear kept soldiers fighting until the end of the war or, when
they felt defeat was imminent, drove them to seek surrender to a less resentful American Army.
Although many secondary motivational factors for American and German soldiers were
nearly identical – including the impact of officers, training, and thoughts of home – the
American and German armies functioned and emphasized these factors differently. Therefore,
the impact that they had on combat motivation differed according to the emphasis that each army
placed on them. For example, the Wehrmacht was determined that each German C.O.,
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regardless of social status, embodied Wehrmacht values and was hardened and combat ready.
On the other hand, the U.S. Army began pushing men through OCS and shuttling West Point
graduates to the European Theatre in order to fulfill the need for C.O.s on the frontlines.
Although American C.O.s still had an impact soldier motivation, they did not boost morale as
significantly as German C.O.s were able to. Rather, it was N.C.O.s that had the most positive
impact on soldier morale in the U.S. Army. Similarly, institutional punishment influenced
soldiers in both armies. However, the Wehrmacht’s willingness to execute its own men at high
rates, compared to the U.S. Army’s reliance on less severe and informal penalties, resulted in
punishment playing a greater role in motivating German than American soldiers. Likewise,
combat exhaustion was a factor that decreased motivation in both armies but stemmed from
different institutional issues that were unique to each army. For the U.S. Army, this included a
poor replacement and unit rotation system that persisted throughout the War. For the
Wehrmacht, combat exhaustion was a result of its desperation for fighting men toward the end of
the war, which caused the Army to push unqualified men and boys into combat. Therefore, the
American and German soldiers shared common secondary factors that influenced their drive to
fight, but the impact that each of these factors had differed between each army.
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